THE AIR FORCE WAY OF WAR: U. S. TACTICS AND TRAINING AFTER VIETNAM
Book ID/图书代码： 13012015B79336
English Summary/英文概要： On December 18, 1972, more than one hundred U.S. B-52 bombers flew over North Vietnam to initiate Operation Linebacker II. During the next eleven days, sixteen of these planes were shot down and another four suffered heavy damage. These losses soon proved so devastating that Strategic Air Command was ordered to halt the bombing. The U.S. Air Force’s poor performance in this and other operations during Vietnam was partly due to the fact that they had trained their pilots according to methods devised during World War II and the Korean War, when strategic bombers attacking targets were expected to take heavy losses. Warfare had changed by the 1960s, but the USAF had not adapted. Between 1972 and 1991, however, the Air Force dramatically changed its doctrines and began to overhaul the way it trained pilots through the introduction of a groundbreaking new training program called "Red Flag."
In The Air Force Way of War, Brian D. Laslie examines the revolution in pilot instruction that Red Flag brought about after Vietnam. The program’s new instruction methods were dubbed "realistic" because they prepared pilots for real-life situations better than the simple cockpit simulations of the past, and students gained proficiency on primary and secondary missions instead of superficially training for numerous possible scenarios. In addition to discussing the program’s methods, Laslie analyzes the way its graduates actually functioned in combat during the 1980s and ’90s in places such as Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Iraq. Military historians have traditionally emphasized the primacy of technological developments during this period and have overlooked the vital importance of advances in training, but Laslie’s unprecedented study of Red Flag addresses this oversight through its examination of the seminal program.
Chinese Summary/中文概要： 1972年12月18日，100多枚美国B-52炸弹横扫越南北部，开始了第二阶段的空袭。接下来的11天里，16架飞机被击落，另有4架严重损毁。由于损失过于惨重，空军指挥部受命停止空袭。美军在越战中差强人意的表现，部分是由于其训练飞行员的方式仍旧沿袭了二战中的那套策略。到20世纪60年代，战争发生了改变，但美国空军却未因此而调整其战术。然而，1972至1991年期间，美军大幅度地改变其战术策略，并且开始彻底改变其训练飞行员的方式。
在《空军战争》一书中，Brian D. Laslie详细审视了越战后美军对飞行员指导上的变革，新的指导方式被认为是“实用的”，因为该方式为飞行员提供了面对真实场景的解决方案，而不仅仅是以往的驾驶员座舱模拟。除了探讨新的方式，Laslie还剖析了空军学校的毕业生在20世纪80年代和90年代的几场战役中的实际表现。一直以来，军事历史学家过多的强调这一时期的技术发展，而忽略了训练革新的重要性。Laslie的著作正好填补了这方面的空白。(LYR)
Awards/获奖情况：“非常有趣、实用的一本书，分析了越战后美国空军是如何改革其训练方式、并且利用新的训练方式在多次战役中取得胜利的，该书对于空军、军事、国防爱好者而言是一本非常有吸引力的读物。”——James S. Corum，《小规模战争中的空中力量:与叛乱和恐怖分子作战》的作者。
"A very useful and interesting study of the story of how the USAF revamped its training after the Vietnam War and created a program that brought a high level of success in several conflicts. The book should have a wide appeal among those interested in airpower, military affairs, and security policy."—James S. Corum, author of Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists
About the Author/作者介绍： Brian D. Laslie 是北美空防司令部及美国北方司令部的副指挥官历史学家。
Brian D. Laslie is deputy command historian at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
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Complex/Traditional Chinese/繁体中文：AVAILABLE
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